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THE CONTRACEPTION MANDATE'
CarolineMala Corbin
ABSTRACT-Under the new health care regime, health insurance plans
must cover contraception. While religious employers are exempt from this
requirement, religiously affiliated employers are not. Several have sued,
claiming that the "contraception mandate" violates the Free Exercise
Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act. This Essay explains why the contraception mandate violates none of
them.
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Law. Thanks to the participants of the Third Annual Law and Religion
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Sergio Campos, Michael Cheah, and Mary Ann Franks for their helpful
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INTRODUCTION
Health care in the United States is undergoing a sea change thanks to
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.' Among the many firsts:
employers that offer health insurance must cover certain preventive
services for women, including contraception.2 This requirement-often
called the "contraception mandate"-has generated a huge outcry,
especially from the U.S. Catholic hierarchy. Although churches,
synagogues, mosques, and other religious institutions that predominately
serve and employ people of their own faith are exempt, religiously
affiliated institutions that serve and employ people of many different
faiths-such as schools, hospitals, and social services providers-are not.4
I Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
2 The Act requires an employer's group health plan to cover women's "preventive care." Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2713(a)(4), 124 Stat. at 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §300gg13(a)(4) (West 2011 & Supp. 2012)). As recommended by the independent Institute of Medicine,
women's preventive care was defined to include FDA-approved contraception methods. Press Release,
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Affordable Care Act Ensures Women Receive Preventive
Services at No Additional Cost (Aug. 1, 2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/201 Ipres/
08/20110801b.html.
See, e.g., Steven Spearie, United States Conference for Catholic Bishops Files Challenge to
Contraception Mandate, METROWEST DAILY NEWS (June 15, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://www.metro
westdailynews.com/2012-elections/x Il 06456357/United-States-Conference-for-Catholic-Bishops-fileschallenge-to-contraception-mandate (quoting Catholic Bishop Thomas John Poprocki as saying that the
mandate was "an unprecedented attack by the federal government on one of America's most cherished
freedoms: the freedom to practice one's religion without government interference").
4 An entity is exempt if it meets the following four criteria:
(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organization.
(2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the
organization.
(3) The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the
organization.
(4) The organization is a nonprofit organization as described in section 6033(a)(1) and section
6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
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It is the lack of an exemption for the latter organizations that has generated
protests.
According to the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (the
"Bishops"), forcing their religiously affiliated institutions to facilitate
access to contraception-the use of which clashes with fundamental tenets
of the Catholic faith-violates their religious conscience.' President
Obama's proposed compromise, where insurance companies rather than the
religious employers would pay for the coverage, did not assuage them:
"The only complete solution to this religious liberty problem is for [the
government] to rescind the mandate of these objectionable services."'
When the White House declined to revoke the contraception mandate, over
forty Catholic dioceses, schools, and social services organizations filed
lawsuits against the federal government. The complaints argue that making
religiously affiliated organizations offer comprehensive insurance coverage
contravenes, among other things, the Free Exercise Clause, the freedom of
association guaranteed by the Free Speech Clause, and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).'
In fact, the contraception mandate violates none of these. As a neutral
law of general applicability, it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
Nor does it interfere with associational membership in violation of freedom
of association. It does not trigger RFRA because it fails to qualify as a
substantial burden on anyone's conscience and would survive strict
scrutiny in any case. To start, most American Catholics do not consider the
ban on contraception central to their faith,' as a vast majority of Catholic
women have used birth control.' In addition, the claim that the
contraception mandate illegally forces Catholic institutions to send a
message that clashes with their fundamental beliefs overlooks the way that
Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,626 (Aug. 3, 2011) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(B)(1)-(4)).
5 The Church teaches that "each and every marital act must of necessity retain its intrinsic
relationship to the procreation of human life." Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae: Encyclical of Pope Paul
VI on the Regulation of Birth (July 25, 1968), available at http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/paul vi/
encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi enc 25071968 humanae-vitae en.html. Consequently, the use of
artificial contraception to prevent new human beings from coming into existence is "repugnant" and "in
opposition to the plan of God and His holy will." Id.
6 Press Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Bishops Renew Call to Legislative Action
on Religious Liberty (Feb.10, 2012), available at http://www.usccb.org/news/2012/12-026.cfm.
See, e.g., Complaint at 20-22, 23-24, Ave Maria Univ. v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-88-FTM-29SPC
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2012) (arguing violations of the Free Exercise Clause, freedom of association, and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Complaint at 16-19, Belmont Abbey Coll. v. Sebelius, No.
1:11 -cv-01 989-GK (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2011) (arguing the same violations).
See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing American Catholics' views of
contraception).
9 See infra note 29 (stating that 98% of Catholic women who have had sex have used
contraception).
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the genuine and independent choice of individuals to use contraception
breaks the chain of causation, such that contraception use cannot be
attributed to the religious entity. Finally, whatever burden "facilitating"
prohibited conduct imposes, it is simply too attenuated to justify an
exemption when balanced against the direct burden on women's autonomy
and equality.
I. FREE EXERCISE
There is little basis for a constitutional free exercise claim. As its name
indicates, the Free Exercise Clause protects the free exercise of religion."o
However, it only protects religious practices against discriminatory laws;
Employment Division, Departmentof Human Resources v. Smith held that
neutral laws of general applicability do not violate the Free Exercise
Clause." A law is neutral as long as it does not intentionally single out a
religion for disfavor,12 and it is generally applicable if it applies across the
board. 3 Given that the mandate neither targets religiously affiliated
institutions nor is riddled with exceptions, it meets the neutrality and
general applicability requirements. Smith embodies the shift in Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence towards more equal treatment between
religious and secular organizations. 4 This view is usually expressed by the
idea that if religious organizations are able to compete for federal contracts,
grants, and vouchers on equal footing with secular organizations then they
ought to abide by the same rules as secular organizations." In any event,
the contraception mandate is a neutral law of general applicability and
therefore does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11 494 U.S. 872, 879-80 (1990). The Supreme Court has noted that "[n]eutrality and general
applicability are interrelated, and . .. failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the
other has not been satisfied." Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
531 (1993).
12 See, e.g., Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 534 (finding that the ordinances were not neutral because
"suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship service was the object of the ordinances").
1 See, e.g., id. at 543-45 (finding that the ordinances were not generally applicable since they were
grossly underinclusive).
14 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionalityof the Ministerial Exemption
from AntidiscriminationLaw, 75 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1965, 1990 (2007).
15 The Supreme Court's recent recognition of the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor
EvangelicalLutheran Church & School v. EEOC does not alter the Free Exercise Clause analysis. 132
S. Ct. 694 (2012) (holding that under the religion clauses, a church's decision to terminate a minister
was not subject to antidiscrimination law, even if the decision was not religiously required). The
ministerial exception does not apply here as the mandate involves neither ministers nor matters of
internal church governance. Indeed, whether an organization must supply comprehensive health
insurance to people outside their religion is not at all the same as whether they must retain a minister.
See, e.g., Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 77 (Cal. 2004) ("This
case does not implicate internal church governance; it implicates the relationship between a nonprofit
public benefit corporation and its employees, most ofwhom do not belong to the Catholic Church.").
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II. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
The freedom of association argument is no more successful than the
Free Exercise one. The Free Speech Clausel 6 is designed to promote the
free flow of ideas and opinions. It protects expressive associations because
they allow like-minded people to associate and thereby amplify their voice
and message." Under freedom of association, expressive associations
cannot be forced to accept members whose presence might undermine the
association's message."
The freedom of association argument is often made by analogy to Boy
Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale, a case that strengthened associational rights." In
Dale, the Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts were entitled to an
exemption from a public accommodation law that would have required
them to admit members regardless of their sexual orientation.20 The Boy
Scouts of America argued that because their association taught that
homosexuality was wrong, forcing them to accept a homosexual scout
would undermine that message in violation of their freedom of expressive
association, and the Court agreed.2 ' Here, the Bishops argue that because
their religion teaches that contraception is wrong, forcing them to provide
contraception would undermine that message and therefore violate their
freedom of expressive association.
This expansive view of Dale strays too far from its expressive
association roots. Not every act triggers the freedom of association;22 only
those involving the right to associate or not associate with someone do. In
Dale, the Boy Scouts of America asserted its right to not associate with a
gay scout.23 Unlike the law in Dale, the contraceptive mandate does not
16 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17 Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981) ("[B]y collective
effort individuals can make their views known, when, individually, their voices would be faint or
lost.").
1s Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 651-55 (2000).
19 Id at 640.
20 Id. at 644.
21 Id. at 651-55.
22 Similarly, not every action that has an expressive component is expressive or symbolic
conduct
for purposes of the Free Speech Clause. That is, only conduct that is meant to convey a message and is
understood as conveying that message-like burning a draft card or flag-triggers the Free Speech
Clause. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). To hold otherwise would
create a rule that all conduct is presumptively expressive. Id. at 293 n.5.
[C]ompliance with a law regulating health care benefits is not speech. ... For purposes of the free
speech clause, simple obedience to a law that does not require one to convey a verbal or symbolic
message cannot reasonably be seen [as] a statement of support for the law or its purpose. Such a
rule would, in effect, permit each individual [or entity] to choose which laws [to] obey merely by
declaring his agreement or opposition.
Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 89 (Cal. 2004). In short, providing
health insurance does not trigger the Free Speech Clause.
23 Dale, 530 U.S. at 646.
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force any religiously affiliated institution to associate with anyone against
its will.24
In addition, freedom of association is meant to protect the creation and
development of the association's voice, which is not in jeopardy here. That
is, the freedom to associate allows an association to control its membership
because it recognizes that the views of its members will influence its
overall message.25 If there are many gay scouts in the Boy Scouts, then its
anti-homosexuality message may dissipate. Including contraception in an
employee's health insurance package, however, does not pose this same
risk for religiously affiliated associations. These employers are not being
forced to accept people whose views on contraception will dilute the
Vatican's anti-contraception stance. Indeed, this would be a peculiar
argument to make, given that these organizations, often by definition, hire
many non-Catholics.
Furthermore, to extend freedom of association rights beyond the right
to associate or not associate with particular people would provide an end
run around the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.
Instead of arguing that a neutral law of general applicability violated their
constitutional rights by forcing them to act in a way that burdened their free
exercise, a religious institution could argue that the law burdened their free
association by forcing them to condone that act. Such an expansive reading
of expressive association could make Smith inapplicable to religious
organizations. It would allow any religious employer to claim that doing
something they would rather not-provide men and women equal benefits,
pay taxes, comply with health or labor laws, etc.-violates their right to
freedom of association. Acknowledging such a right would risk making
every religious entity a law unto itself, as the Smith Court feared.26
III. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
In order to receive an exemption under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, the plaintiffs must establish that the mandate imposes a
substantial religious burden.27 There are many reasons to conclude that it
does not and that it is actually granting an exemption that would impose a
substantial burden on the women who would otherwise have access to free
24 Cf Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859
N.E.2d 459, 465 (N.Y. 2006) ("The
legislation does not interfere with plaintiffs' right to communicate, or to refrain from communicating,
any message they like; nor does it compel them to associate, or prohibit them from associating, with
anyone.").
25 Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 ("Forcing a group to accept certain members may impair the ability of the
group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to express.").
26 Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (arguing that a regime that
granted exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability unless a state demonstrated a compelling
interest would allow an individual "to become a law unto himself' (quoting Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878))).
27 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-l(a)
(2006).
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contraception. In any case, the law would survive strict scrutiny, as it is
narrowly tailored to advance the compelling state interest in women's
autonomy and equality.
A. Whose Conscience?
The first problem with the Bishops' claim is that it is not clear whose
conscience is being violated when religiously affiliated institutions include
contraception in their insurance plans. Polls consistently show that most
Catholics in the United States believe that contraception use is not
inconsistent with being a "good Catholic."28 Indeed, 98% of American
Catholic women have used contraception,29 and most American Catholics,
men and women, express a desire for the Pope to relax the Church's
official position on the issue.30 If the vast majority of American Catholics
have no religious objection to contraception and actually wish that the
religious doctrine were different, then it is a stretch to say that the provision
of contraception violates their conscience.
The obvious rebuttal is that whatever American Catholics say, official
Church dogma condemns contraception. But even if the Vatican's position
is absolutely clear on this issue, what should count as central religious
tenets for purposes of determining whether the government has
substantially burdened free exercise? Should they be whatever the Church
leadership declares them to be? Or should they be what the actual members
of the Church live and experience them to be? Many have insisted that
when one joins a hierarchical organization, one concedes that the hierarchy
decides. But what if members of the faith disagree with this view? What if,
as is the case for an overwhelming percentage of American Catholics, their

28 When American Catholics were asked, "Do you think someone who practices artificial
birth

control can still be a good Catholic?," 84% responded "yes," 11% answered "no," and 5% didn't know
or wouldn't answer. CBS News Poll, Mar, 2011, ROPER CTR., http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_
access/ipoll/ipoll.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (subscription required). When the question was
phrased, "Do you think it's possible to disagree with the Pope on issues like birth control, abortion or
divorce and still be a good Catholic?," 83% answered it was possible compared to 13% who thought it
was not. CBS News/New York Times Poll, Feb, 2013, ROPER CTR., http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/
data accesslipoll/ipoll.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (subscription required).
29 Among Catholic women who have had sex, 98% have used a contraception method other than
natural family planning. RACHEL K. JONES & JOERG DREWEKE, GUTTMACHER INST., COUNTERING
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: NEW EVIDENCE ON RELIGION AND CONTRACEPTIVE USE 4 (2011).
30 When polled, 78% of American Catholics thought the next Pope should allow Catholics to use

birth control, while 21% thought he should not. USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll Results, USA TODAY
(May 20, 2005, 11:56AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/polls/tables/live/2005-04-03-poll.htm
(asking, "Do you think the next pope should-or should not ... [a]llow Catholics to use birth
control?"); see also CBS News/New York Times Poll, Feb, 2013, supra note 28 (finding that 71%
thought the next Pope should be for the use of artificial methods of birth control compared to 25% who
thought he should be against it).
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conception of what it means to be Catholic does not include unquestioning
deference?'. Is a court to say otherwise?
It might be argued that it is inappropriate for the state to make these
determinations, and indeed the Establishment Clause bars the state from
resolving theological disputes.32 This exact concern was a main reason the
Supreme Court abandoned the substantial burden inquiry for free exercise
challenges and replaced it with the Smith regime.33 Courts forced to address
the issue, as those confronted with a RFRA claim must, have two choices:
they can either do their best to determine in each particular case whether a
law imposes a substantial burden on the plaintiffs, or they can assume that
it has whenever the hierarchy claims that it has.34 Either way, when the
beliefs of members and leadership do not align, as here, the court risks
resolving a theological dispute about what qualifies as a central tenet of the
faith. Deciding to defer to the hierarchy, however, means the courts always
favor the most powerful members of the religious community, sometimes
at the expense of less powerful members and definitely at the expense of
the people who will be burdened by the accommodation.35
B. ForcedEndorsement or Facilitation

In any event, the mandate works no direct infringement on anticontraception religious beliefs. No religious individual or entity is forced to
In fact, when American Catholics were asked, "Do you think Catholics should always obey
official Church teachings on such moral issues as birth control and abortion, or do you think it is
possible for Catholics to make up their own minds on these issues?," 88% thought they could make up
their own minds, compared to a scant 11% who believed that Catholics should always obey official
Church teachings. Abortion and Birth Control, CNN/ORC Poll, POLLINGREPORT.COM (Feb. 10-13,
0
2012), http://www.pollingreport.com/abortion.htm. A similarly large number-77 /o--answered "yes"
to the question: "Do you think that someone who does not believe in the authority of the Pope can still
be a good Catholic, or not?" CBS News/New York Times Poll, Americans, Catholics React to Reports
of Child Abuse by Priests, question 18 (May 4, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/poll
catholics_050310.pdf.
32 See, e.g., Andrew Koppleman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REv. 87, 108 (2002) ("The
Establishment Clause forbids the state from declaring religious truth.").
33 See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990). Prior to Smith, the
Free Exercise Clause mandated exemptions from laws (including neutral laws of general applicability)
that imposed a substantial burden on religious exercise unless the challenged law passed strict scrutiny.
See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
34 I suppose there is a third option for courts, which is to assume without deciding that the law
imposes a substantial burden, and let the court's view of centrality inform the strict scrutiny analysis.
35 It is also odd to discuss the religious conscience of an organization. Indeed, RFRA purports to
protect "person[s]" from substantial burdens. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (2006) ("Government shall not
substantially burden a person 's exercise of religion. . . ." (emphasis added)). People have consciences;
they can feel indignity, shame, or remorse. Institutions do not. Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption
and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REv. 391, 422-23
(1987). Perhaps the conscience of an institution is the collected consciences of its members. However,
as discussed, most American members of the Catholic Church generally do not equate contraception use
with an infringement on their conscience.
31
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use, supply, or for the most part even pay for contraception. Nonetheless,
the mandate's opponents insist that it is an affront to religious conscience
to include contraception in insurance plans. According to the Bishops,
religiously affiliated employers "will be forced by government to violate
their own teachings within their very own institutions. This is not only an
injustice in itself, but it also undermines the effective proclamation of those
teachings to the faithful and to the world."" In their view, merely making
contraception available communicates endorsement of what they believe to
be sinful and facilitates this religiously proscribed conduct."
Similar arguments about endorsement and facilitation were made
when the constitutionality of school voucher programs was challenged in
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris." In Zelman, families were given vouchers to
help pay for tuition at secular or religious private schools. Ninety-six
percent of voucher recipients chose religious schools.40 Opponents of the
program complained that making federal money available to religious
organizations with no strings attached violated the Establishment Clause in
two ways. First, it signaled the state's endorsement of religion, which is
forbidden by the Establishment Clause. 4 1 Second, it facilitated religious
teaching in violation of the Establishment Clause's prohibition on
government funding of or participation in proselytization.4 2
The Supreme Court rejected both claims.4 3 The Court held that
although government money may ultimately have been used to buy
religious texts or pay for religious lessons, the religious conduct could not
be attributed to the state.' In other words, the state cannot be said to have
paid for or endorsed the religious conduct, even though it was ultimately
facilitating religious schooling. Why? The money ended up in the coffers
of the religious schools as a result of the genuine and independent decisions
of private individuals. It was not the state that decided to fund and endorse
religion; it was the private individuals participating in the voucher program
36 As it stands now, insurance companies will cover the cost of contraception
rather than the
employers. However, this compromise does not address religiously affiliated employers that are selfinsured. See, e.g., Katie Thomas, Self-Insured Complicate Health Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/business/self-insured-complicate-health-deal.html.
3 Admin. Comm. of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, United for Religious Freedom (Mar.
14, 2012), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/upload/Admin-Religious-Freedom,
pdf.
38 In other words, there is an expressive component (forcing them to send the message that they
condone that conduct) and a material component (forcing them to facilitate forbidden conduct) to the
harm.
3 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
40 Id. at 647.
41 Id. at 654.
42

Id. at 649.

43 Id. at 653-55.
4

Id. at 649-53.

1477

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
who did so.45 That private individual choice broke the chain of attribution
linking the religious conduct and the state.
The same reasoning about individual choice breaking a link can be
applied to the contraception debate. In Zelman, it was the parent receiving
the government-provided voucher who broke the chain of attribution by
deciding to send the child to a religious school.46 With the contraception
mandate, the female employee-often not even Catholic-who receives the
employer-provided insurance breaks the chain. The link is even more
attenuated when the employer's insurance company, not the employer, pays
for the contraception. In each case, the conduct at issue-the funding of
religious schooling forbidden by the Establishment Clause or the use of
birth control forbidden by the Catholic Church-is attributable to the
private individual, not the entity furnishing the voucher or insurance.47
Because the problematic conduct is not attributable to the state or
employer, no reasonable person would think that they engaged in or
endorsed it.
The mandatory nature of the coverage also weakens the "forced to
condone contraception" argument. The Supreme Court rejected as
groundless the fear that state-subsidized religious speech in a public forum
would lead reasonable people to conclude that the state was endorsing
religious viewpoints in violation of the Establishment Clause.48 The Court
argued that reasonable people would understand that the state was merely
complying with the rules of a public forum; once the state opens up a
forum, it must allow access to all viewpoints, including religious ones. The
same reasoning readily applies to the contraception mandate. Reasonable
people would understand that religiously affiliated employers were not
condoning or endorsing contraception. Rather, reasonable people would
understand that these employers were providing contraception because
health insurance law requires them to cover all basic services. Furthermore,
the mandate does not prevent a religiously affiliated organization from
making its position on contraception clear in any number of ways.49

45 Id
46 Id. at 653.
47 The Bishops might argue that there is a key difference in the analogy: they are being coerced into
doing something while the state is not. That is true. But the analogy is meant to help answer the
question of whether they are forced to do something religiously burdensome. In this case, the answer to
that question is no, so long as there is true private choice to break the chain of attribution. Just as no
reasonable person would think the state is endorsing the theology facilitated by its vouchers, no
reasonable person should think that the religiously affiliated institution is endorsing the medical
services facilitated by its health insurance.
48 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841-42 (1995).
49 See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64-65
(2006) (holding that the requirement that law schools accommodate military recruiting did not restrict
what the law schools may say about the military's policies).
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Still, even if no reasonable person would conclude that the religiously
affiliated schools, hospitals, or social services providers endorse or
condone contraception, these institutions are nevertheless facilitating its
use. After all, if these institutions did not make it available through their
health insurance, the expense would likely mean fewer employees would
use it. Without insurance, birth control pills could cost over $1000 dollars
every year."o Given that the median annual salary in this country for
working women 25-34 years old with a high school diploma is $25,000,"'
the expense is not insignificant.
Nonetheless, if merely "facilitating" third-party conduct that one
disapproves of can violate religious liberty, there is no limit to the number
of exemptions that would have to be granted to preserve a religious
employer's freedom of conscience. Indeed, providing a salary above
minimum wage "facilitates" contraception use by making it more
affordable, yet no one would argue that religiously affiliated organizations
should be exempt from minimum wage laws as a result.52 Clearly, not every
act of facilitation implicates religious liberty. Which ones do? Should a
religiously affiliated homeless shelter be allowed to deny admission to gay
and lesbian couples on the theory that it would condone and facilitate
homosexuality? Should religiously affiliated hospitals be able to deny
visitation in the ICU by same-sex spouses for similar reasons? What about
a religiously affiliated university's ability to deny spousal life insurance
coverage to legally married same-sex couples? Few would answer these
questions in the affirmative-the facilitation is simply too indirect and
works too great a harm to those outside the faith. The same is true for the
contraception mandate.
C. Compelling State Interest

Even if a law imposes a substantial burden on religious conscience, an
exemption will not be granted under RFRA if the law passes strict

50 CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE HIGH COSTS OF BIRTH CONTROL: IT'S NOT AS AFFORDABLE AS
You THINK 1-2 (2012) (noting that with out-of-pocket costs for the birth control pill ranging from
$180-$960 per year, and average out-of-pocket doctor visits ranging from $35-$250, birth control can
cost up to $1210 per year without insurance).
51 Income of Young Adults, NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/
display.asp?id=77 (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
52 Arguably, providing comprehensive health insurance, which is really part of the employee's
compensation package anyway, is not all that different.
53 See O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 4:12-CV-476 (CEJ), 2012 WL
4481208, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012) ("RFRA does not protect against the slight burden on
religious exercise that arises when one's money circuitously flows to support the conduct of other freeexercise-wielding individuals who hold religious beliefs that differ from one's own.").
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scrutiny.54 It is one thing to provide an exemption from a law when such an
accommodation hurts no one, but the calculus should be different if the
challenged accommodation imposes a significant burden on others. In this
case, denying women free access to contraception results in serious and
direct harms to women's autonomy, equality, and equal access to health
care. The state has a compelling interest in avoiding these harms.
Contraception is crucial to women's health." The Institute of Medicine
recommended that contraception be fully covered precisely because it is so
essential for women's well-being. 6 Contraception allows women to better
space their children. It improves prenatal care since women with intentional
pregnancies start care earlier." Birth control also prevents unwanted
pregnancies for women with chronic medical conditions like diabetes, for
whom pregnancy can be especially risky." Indeed, pregnancy is
contraindicated for women with serious health issues such as pulmonary
hypertension and cyanotic heart disease." Finally, millions of American
women need the pill for reasons other than birth control, including
managing polycystic ovary syndrome, endometriosis, dysfunctional uterine
bleeding, menstrual cycle irregularities, excessive menstrual bleeding
(menorrhagia), and severe menstrual pain (dysmenorrhea).o
The ability to control one's reproduction is also central to women's
liberty and equality. It is fundamental to personal and bodily integrityafter all, how can one be an autonomous agent without the power to decide

54 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2006). Recall that a law passes strict scrutiny if it advances a
compelling state interest, such as avoiding serious harm to others, and does so in a narrowly tailored
manner.
It is also crucial for children's health. For example, short intervals between pregnancies are
associated with low birth weight, prematurity, and small-for-gestational-age births. COMM. ON
PREVENTIVE SERVS., INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE
GAPS 103 (2011). See also generally COMM. ON UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, INST. OF MED., THE BEST
INTENTIONS: UNINTENDED PREGNANCY AND THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (Sarah S.
Brown & Leon Eisenberg eds., 1995) (detailing the consequences of unintended pregnancy on children,
women, men, and families).
56 COMM. ON PREVENTIVE SERVS., INST. OF MED., supra note 55, at 109-10. Contraception is also

extremely cost-effective. According to the Institute of Medicine report: "The direct medical cost of
unintended pregnancy in the United States was estimated to be nearly $5 billion in 2002, with the cost
savings due to contraceptive use estimated to be $19.3 billion." Id. at 107.
s7 COMM. ON UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, INST. OF MED., supra note 55, at 66. Good prenatal care

can help prevent complications, such as preeclampsia and eclampsia, both of which can be fatal. Can a
High-Risk PregnancyBe Prevented?, NAT'L INST. OF CHILD HEALTH & HUM. DEV., http://www.nichd.
nih.gov/health/topics/high-risk/conditioninfo/pages/prevented.aspx (last updated Nov. 30, 2012).
COMM. ON PREVENTIVE SERVS., INST. OF MED., supranote 55.

5 Id. at 103-04. The health ramifications-nausea, fatigue, weight gain-of even healthy
pregnancies should also be acknowledged.
60 RACHEL K. JONES, GurMACHER INST., BEYOND BIRTH CONTROL: THE OVERLOOKED BENEFITS

OF ORAL CONTRACEPTIVE PILLS 3 (2011); Andrew M. Kaunitz, Oral Contraceptive Health Benefits:
Perception Versus Reality, 59 CONTRACEPTION 29S (1999).
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what happens to one's own body?" Nor should the importance of
contraception to women's equality be underestimated. Without the ability
to control when or whether to beget a child, a woman cannot participate as
an equal in the social, economic, and political life of this country.62 In any
case, if an employer provides health insurance, it should not discriminate
against employees based on their sex, race, or other protected characteristic
in its provision. Yet, omission of a benefit that only women-and
essentially all women-rely on seems to do just that. Indeed, a health
insurance plan that covers all basic preventive care except for contraception
likely amounts to sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.6
Excluding contraception not only discriminates against female
employees, it also imposes the employer's religious values onto them. Yet,
as one district court recently noted, "RFRA is a shield, not a sword. . . . [I]t
is not a means to force one's religious practices upon others."' Many
employees do not share their employer's religious beliefs and indeed may
have their own religious beliefs about not bearing children they are
unwilling or unable to support. Thus, just as granting an exemption from
social security taxes to an employer "operates to impose the employer's

See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (recognizing that the decision of
whether to "bear or beget" a child is a fundamental one).
62 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992);
see also Jennifer J. Frost
& Laura Duberstein Lindberg, Reasons for Using Contraception:Perspectives of US Women Seeking
Care at Specialized Family Planning Clinics, 87 CONTRACEPTION 465, 465 (2013) ("A majority of
respondents reported that birth control use had allowed them to take better care of themselves or their
families (63%), support themselves financially (56%), complete their education (51%), or keep or get a
job (50%).").
63 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) defines sex
discrimination to include discrimination based on pregnancy. Id. § 2000e(k); see also Erickson v.
Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1271 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (holding that the exclusion of
contraception from a health plan violated Title VII as amended by the PDA); EEOC, Decision on
Coverage of Contraception (Dec 14, 2000), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception,
html (finding that the PDA applies to prescription contraception). But cf In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp't
Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the exclusion of contraception from a
health plan did not violate the PDA because contraception was not "related to" pregnancy). The only
reason state-mandated health insurance without contraception coverage does not raise serious Equal
Protection Clause issues is because of an ill-reasoned, much-derided Supreme Court decision (by an allmale Court) holding that pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimination. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974). Even twenty-five years ago, Sylvia Law could remark that "[c]riticizing
Geduldig has since become a cottage industry." Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution,
132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 983 (1984).
6 O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 4:12-CV-476 (CEJ), 2012 WL 4481208,
at *6 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012) (rejecting a RFRA challenge to the contraception mandate); cf Estate
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) ("The First Amendment ... gives no one the
right to insist that in pursuit of their own [religious] interests others must conform their conduct to his
own religious necessities." (alteration in original) (quoting Otten v. Balt. & Ohio R., 205 F.2d 58, 61
(2d Cir. 1953))).
61
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religious faith on the employees,"" granting an exemption from the
contraception mandate foists the Catholic Bishops' religious views onto
employees, whether or not they are Catholic.66
One plaintiff argues that religious employers are not coercing their
employees or forcing their values on them: "[W]e are simply choosing not
to participate in the use of these drugs. Our 350 employees, many of whom
are not Catholic, freely chose to work here and .. . are aware of the values
we practice . . . ."6' In other words, if women do not like their religiously
affiliated employer's policies, they can work somewhere else." Of course,
the same reasoning applies to the religiously affiliated institutions-if they
do not like the professional responsibilities and requirements that come
with running a hospital, school, or charity, then they could freely choose to
not enter the field.
This point is made even stronger by the fact that so many of these
religiously affiliated organizations are heavily subsidized by public tax
dollars. According to Catholic Charities USA, a leading social services
provider with over 150 affiliates, roughly two-thirds of its total income
comes from the government." Network, a Catholic social justice lobbying
group, reports that the federal government has provided more than 1.5
billion dollars of direct funding to Catholic nonprofit organizations and
programs in the past two years." If a religiously affiliated organization

65 Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 93
(Cal. 2004) (quoting
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982)) (rejecting a religious employer's request for an
exemption from taxes).
66 See
id
67 Michael P. Warsaw, Op-Ed., Contraception, Against
Conscience, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/opinion/why-ewtn-wont-cover-contraception.html; see also
Editorial, Contraception Mandate Violates Religious Freedom, USA TODAY (Feb. 5, 2012, 6:28
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/story/2012-02-05/contraception-mandatereligious-freedom/52975796/1 ("[H]aving freely chosen their employer, they'd have a dubious case for
grievance against institutions that choose not to offer contraception coverage.").
68 First, finding a new job in this economy is easier said than done, especially in a field where
Catholic-affiliated institutions are a major employer. See CATHOLICS FOR A FREE CHOICE, THE FACTS

ABOUT CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2005) (noting that 12% of all hospitals-

over 600-are affiliated with the Catholic Church, and one-quarter of those are located in rural areas,
where alternatives are likely sparse). Second, free market arguments against employee protection laws
have been discredited since the Lochner era.
69 CATHOLIC CHARITIES USA, CATHOLIC CHARITIES AT A GLANCE (reporting that in 2009, 67% of
its total income was from the government). In contrast, only 3% of its income came from Diocesan
Church support. Id
70 Press Release, Network, Setting the Record Straight on Federal Funding for Catholic
Organizations (Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www.networklobby.org/news-media/federal-fundingcatholic-organizations. Catholic universities receive additional government funds from their students'
federal student aid, while Catholic hospitals receive billions from Medicaid and Medicare. See
CATHOLICS FOR AFREE CHOICE, supra note 68, at 2 (noting that in 2002 religiously affiliated hospitals
"received more than $45 billion in public funds," including Medicaid and Medicare funds).
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provides a public service with public money, it should be bound by the
same public laws as its secular counterparts.
In short, ensuring equal access to health care and an equal opportunity
to participate in the social, economic, and political life of the country are
compelling interests." Furthermore, requiring all employers who provide
insurance to cover contraception is narrowly tailored to achieve those
interests.72 It has been argued that government-provided health insurance
would be a less restrictive means of achieving these goals." Apart from the
practical questions, accepting such an argument could potentially decimate
equal protection; it would mean a private company could argue that a law
banning discrimination on the basis of race in the provision of health (or
other) benefits was not narrowly tailored because the government could
simply provide the benefit instead. Such a claim is a distortion of strict
scrutiny and should fail.
CONCLUSION

The contraception mandate is perfectly legal. As a neutral law of
general applicability, it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. As a law
that does not compel religiously affiliated institutions to speak or associate
with unwanted members, it does not violate the Free Speech Clause.
Finally, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is violated only if the
contraception mandate imposes a substantial burden on religious
conscience and fails strict scrutiny. The mandate does no such thing. It
imposes, at most, an uncertain and indirect religious burden on
organizations that are often heavily financed by taxpayer dollars. On the
other hand, an exemption would directly burden women who do not share
their employer's religious views. Whatever place religious exemptions may
have in our legal scheme, this is not it.
Plaintiffs have argued that the government's interests cannot be compelling given all the
exceptions to the contraception mandate. For example, the mandate does not apply to companies with
fewer than fifty employees or to grandfathered plans. See, e.g., Newland v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-l 123JLK, 2012 WL 3069154, at *7 (D. Colo. July 27, 2012) (finding that the exceptions undermined the
state's claim that its interests were compelling). Exceptions might inform the compelling interest
analysis when there is a question about the importance of the state's goal. If we are uncertain whether
the state's interest in the uniform appearance of police officers really is compelling, the existence of
numerous exceptions to its policy might help us conclude it is not. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police
Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366-67 (3d Cir. 1999). However, exceptions
should not matter when the state's goals-such as its interest in promoting health, bodily integrity, and
sex equality-have long been recognized as compelling.
72 How strict the tailoring must be under RFRA is not altogether clear. If RFRA were meant to
reinstate the pre-Smith test as practiced, then it is not very demanding, since the Supreme Court rarely
found that laws failed strict scrutiny in Free Exercise Clause challenges. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
73 See, e.g., Newland, 2012 WL 3069154, at *7-8 (considering the plaintiffs argument that
government-provided insurance is one alternative in determining whether to grant a preliminary
injunction).
71
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